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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
SUMMARY 
NO NUISANCE CLAIM PERMITTED IN 
FEDERAL COURT FOR AIR OR WATER 
POLLUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water,! the 
Ninth Circuit decided that the Audubon Society could not state 
federal common law nuisance claims against the Los Angeles De-
partment of Water and others for air and water pollution arising 
out of the diversion of fresh water streams from California's 
Mono Lake.2 The court held that the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act preempts federal nuisance claims based on water 
pollution.3 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff could not 
state a federal nuisance claim for air pollution because this case 
does not involve any uniquely federal interests and because a 
true interstate dispute has not arisen.· The court declined to de-
cide whether or not the Audubon Society's air pollution claim 
was preempted by the federal Clean Air Act. G 
1. National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 858 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(per Brunetti, C.J.; the other panel members were Goodwin, J. and Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
2. [d. at 1418. 
3. [d. 
4. [d. at 1416-17. 
5. [d. at 1418. 
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II. FACTS 
This case consolidates appeals from a suit filed by the Na-
tional Audubon Society and others against the Los Angeles De-
partment of Water and Power ("DWP") to restrain the DWP's 
diversion of four fresh water streams that would otherwise flow 
to Mono Lake.8 It is part of an ongoing effort by citizens and 
environmental groups to protect Mono Lake.' The Audubon So-
ciety alleged that this diversion of Mono Lake's fresh water, by 
lowering the level of the lake, has caused water pollution in the 
form of increased salinity.s Also, the Audubon Society's federal 
nuisance claim alleged that the diversion caused dust storms to 
rise from the uncovered lake bed resulting in air pollution.9 
The district court held that the water pollution claim was 
preempted by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
("FWPCA").IO Furthermore, the district court held that the Au-
dubon Society could state a federal common law nuisance claim 
for air pollution and that the claim was not preempted by the 
Clean Air Act. 11 Finally, the district court remanded the state 
claims to the state court. 12 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY 
The Ninth Circuit first considered whether the FWPCA 
preempts federal common law nuisance claims. IS It then re-
viewed the question of whether the Audubon Society should be 
6. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d 1409, 1410 (9th Cir. 1988). 
7. See e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983). Suit 
was filed for the same purpose: to prevent the diversion of the water from Mono Lake to 
Los Angeles. The California Supreme Court held that the state of California has an af-
firmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of 
water resources. In fact, this case has been pending in various forms for approximately 
ten years. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1410. The present case represents con-
solidated interlocutory appeals and appeals as-of-right which arose from a lawsuit origi-
nally filed in 1979 by the National Audubon Society and others. Id. 
8. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1410-11. 
9. Id. at 1412. 
10. Id. See also The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et. seq. (1982). 
11. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1412. 
12. Id. 
13. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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permitted to state a federal common law nuisance claim for air 
pollution.14 
A. FEDERAL COMMON LAW NUISANCE CLAIM - WATER POLLUTION 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that 
the FWPCA preempts federal common law nuisance claims on 
the subject of water pollution.1Ii The Ninth Circuit stated that 
the law was clear, relying on a recent Supreme Court decision, 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clam-
mers Ass'n. 1e The court pointed out that where federal legisla-
tion occupies the field, the federal legislation preempts all fed-
eral common law.17 The Supreme Court unequivocally stated in 
Middlesex that "the federal common law of nuisance in the area 
of water pollution is entirely preempted by the more compre-
hensive scope of the FWPCA. "18 The Ninth Circuit therefore 
swiftly denied the Audubon Society's federal common law nui-
sance claim for water pollution.19 
B. FEDERAL COMMON LAW NUISANCE CLAIM - AIR POLLUTION 
Whether or not the Audubon Society can state a claim for 
air pollution is a much more difficult problem because the Su-
preme Court has not yet decided whether the Clean Air Act 
preempts federal common law nuisance suits for air pollution.20 
In connection with this claim, the court considered the general 
nature of federal common law and whether or not substantive 
air pollution law should be developed by the federal courts to 
remedy the problems at Mono Lake.21 The Ninth Circuit prelim-
inarily noted that "there is no general federal common law."22 
The court said, "[f]ederal courts, unlike state courts, are not 
14. [d. at 1413-17. 
15. [d. at 1412. 
16. [d. See also Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). The plaintiffs in this case were fishermen who alleged damage 
to fishing grounds caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other waste. 
17. [d., citing International Paper Co. v. Ouelette, 107 S. Ct. 805, 810 (1987). 
18. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 
U.S. I, 22 (1981). 
19. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1412. 
20. [d. at 1413. 
21. [d. 
22. [d. 
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general common law courts and do not possess a general power 
to develop and apply their own rules of decision. "23 However, 
the court noted that the Supreme Court has "recognized the 
need and authority of [federal] courts to fashion federal com-
mon law in a 'few and restricted' instances."24 These instances 
fall into two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision 
is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests"21S and those 
in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop 
substantive law.26 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed whether Congress gave the 
courts the power to develop federal substantive law27 and noted 
that the leading statute regulating air pollution is the Clean Air 
Act.26 The court engaged in a detailed review of various sections 
of the Clean Air Act.29 The Clean Air Act authorizes the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency to promulgate air standards and 
regulations to implement those standards.30 The Ninth Circuit 
noted that the Clean Air Act provides the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and the states the power to remedy air pollution 
under the statute.31 Therefore, the court reasoned that federal 
common law would apply only if there was a unique federal in-
23. Id. See also Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) citing Erie R.R. Co. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938). 
24. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1413, (citing Texas Industries, Inc. v. Rad-
cliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1980), quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 
651 (1963). 
25. Id., (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964». 
26. Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 652. 
27. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1413. 
28. Id., see also the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq. (1982). The legislative 
purpose of the Clean Air Act is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air 
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of 
its population." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1982). 
29. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1413-18. 
30. Id. at 1414. The court noted that two sections of the Clean Air Act govern the 
establishment and revision of the national ambient air quality standards. Section 108 
directs the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to identify pollutants 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare and to issue 
air quality criteria for them. Id., see also The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1982). 
Section 109 directs the Administrator to propose and promulgate primary and secondary 
national ambient air quality standards for pollutants identified under section 108. The 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982). Interestingly, the Environmental Protection 
Agency has evaluated the "fugitive dust" problem in the Mono Lake area and has classi-
fied it as an area the "probably has an adequate control strategy." National Audubon 
Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1414. 
31. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1414. 
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terest, or "true interstate disputes."32 The Ninth Circuit noted 
that by promulgating the Clean Act Congress recognized some 
limited federal interest in air quality.33 However, the court noted 
that individual states and local governments have "primary re-
sponsibility for assuring air quality" within their borders.34 The 
court concluded that the issues presented in this case do not re-
quire resolution under federal law.31l The court concluded that 
this case does not implicate any "uniquely federal interests" and 
therefore the Audubon Society cannot make a federal common 
law nuisance claim for air pollution.36 The court compared this 
case to other factually intensive cases alleging interstate pollu-
tion.37 The court noted that the Supreme Court "considers only 
those interstate controversies which involve a state suing sources 
outside of its own territory because they are causing pollution 
within the state to be. inappropriate for state law to control, and 
therefore subject to resolution according to federal common 
law."38 Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that this case 
could evolve into a dispute involving conflicting rights of states, 
it nonetheless concluded that National Audubon Society in-
volved essentially a "domestic dispute."89 
B. DISSENT 
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Reinhardt agreed with the ma-
jority that the plaintiffs' claim for water pollution was pre-
empted by the FWPCA.40 However, Judge Reinhardt strongly 
disagreed with the majority on the issue of the application of 
federal common law nuisance doctrine to air pollution.41 He as-
serted that "the provisions of that Act [The Clean Air Act] serve 
32. [d. at 1416-17. 
33. [d. at 1415. 
34. [d. quoting The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a). The Clean Air Act also de-
clares that "the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary re-
sponsibility of states and governments." The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3). 
35. [d. at 1416. 
36. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1416. 
37. [d. at 1417. See also State of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), 
holding that the courts may apply federal common law in a case involving an action for 
water pollution caused by one state's sewerage entities polluting Lake Michigan and af-
fecting adjoining states. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 107. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. at 1418. 
41. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1418. 
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to demonstrate that there is a uniquely federal interest in air 
quality."42 He contended that the Clean Air Act is not an "a11-
encompassing program" and does not preempt federal common 
law.4s The dissent argued that the Clean Air Act is less compre-
hensive than that of the Clean Water Act "in that the former 
statute does not control emissions from every source, but only 
from those sources that are found to threaten the air quality 
standards promulgated by the [Environmental Protection 
Agency]."44 Therefore, Judge Reinhardt concluded that the 
Clean Air Act does not preempt federal common law nuisance 
claims for air pollution in general or for the plaintiffs' claim in 
particular. 4~ 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Supporters of preserving Mono Lake failed in yet another 
judicial move to thwart the siphoning off of the lake's fresh 
water supply. This case involved the attempted application of 
nuisance doctrine to areas protected by federal law. In National 
Audubon Society, the Ninth Circuit rejected federal common 
law nuisance claims regarding the alleged water and air pollution 
in the Mono Lake region.46 
Tatiana Roodkowsky* 
42. [d. at 1420. 
43. [d. at 1425. 
44. [d .. at 1425. 
45. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1426. 
46. National Audubon Soc'y, 858 F.2d at 1418. 
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